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Abstract: This article arises from research of a course in International 
Corporate Governance of our Ph.D. from the University of St. Gallen 
(Switzerland) and applied in a company that has suffered a scandal 
which would affect its operations in Nicaragua. The analysis applied 
from the KISS Principles of the professor Dr. Martin Hilb of University 
of St.Gallen. The violations of law that underlie the case described 
in this paper stem from actions and omissions relating to BellSouth’s 
subsidiary in Nicaragua, Telefonía Celular de Nicaragua, S.A. This is a 
reflexion article is only for academic purposes.
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Resumen: Este artículo surgió a partir de una investigación 
de un curso de International Corporate Governance de nuestro 
doctorado en la Universidad de St. Gallen (Suiza) y se aplicó en 
una compañía que hubiese sufrido un escándalo, el cual afectó 
sus operaciones en Nicaragua. Para el análisis se aplicaron 
los principios KISS del profesor Dr. Martin Hilb, profesor de la 
mencionada universidad. Las violaciones del derecho y de la 
ley que subyacen en el caso descrito en este documento son 
producto de las acciones y omisiones relativas a la filial de 
BellSouth en Nicaragua, Telefonía Celular de Nicaragua, S.A. 
Este artículo de reflexión es solo para fines académicos.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, BellSouth expanded its 
operations into Latin America by acquiring tele-
phone companies in 11 countries: Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Panama, Ecuador, 
Uruguay, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In the early 
years of BellSouth’s expansion into Latin America, 
BellSouth acquired minority ownership positions in 
the local companies and allowed its local in-country 
partners to manage the companies’ daily operations. 
In a gradual shift of strategy that came around 
the year 2000, BellSouth began acquiring majority 
ownership of the local companies and exercising 
greater management control over their operations. 
As will be explained later, the violations of law that 
underlie the case described in this paper stem from 
actions and omissions relating to BellSouth’s sub-
sidiary in Nicaragua, Telefonía Celular de Nicaragua, 
S.A. 
Background
BellSouth Corporation (now under the name AT&T) 
is an American telecommunications holding com-
pany based in Atlanta, Georgia. It serves close to 
34 million customers in the United States and in 
18 other countries, making it one of the world’s 
largest communications companies. It provides local 
telecommunications as well as wireless local and 
long distance service, long distance access, cable 
and digital television, Internet access, and other 
electronic commerce. What is more, BellSouth is a 
leading advertising and publishing company, put-
ting out many advertising directories, including The 
Real Yellow Pages Online. The company began as a 
regional subdivision of AT&T, or a so-called Baby 
Bell company, with a market in the southeastern 
United States. This region remains a principal source 
of income for the company, with approximately 40 
percent of BellSouth’s revenues comes from provi-
ding traditional local telephone service there. It is 
in no way a strictly regional entity, however, with 
the remaining revenue coming from other services 
both in and outside the South.
BellSouth was one of the seven original Regional Bell 
Operating Companies after the U.S. Department of 
Justice forced the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company to divest itself of its regional telephone 
companies on January 1, 1984. In a merger annou-
nced on March 5, 2006 and executed on December 
29, 2006, AT&T Inc. acquired BellSouth for appro-
ximately US$ 86 billion (1.325 shares of AT&T for 
each share of BellSouth). The combined company 
retained the name AT&T. The merger consolidated 
ownership of Cingular Wireless and Yellowpages.
com, both of which were previously joint ventures 
between BellSouth and AT&T.
Since the merger, wireless services previously offered 
by Cingular Wireless have been offered under the 
AT&T name. Furthermore, BellSouth has officially 
become AT&T South, with its Bell Operating Company 
operating as AT&T Southeast. On June 30, 2007, 
it ceased to perform under the BellSouth name, 
and it was the last of the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies to keep its original corporate name after 
the 1984 AT&T breakup, and the last one to retain 
the Bell logo. Cincinnati Bell, an independent Bell 
System franchise, and not part of the AT&T breakup, 
still employs the “Bell” name, but ceased the use 
of the Bell logo in mid-2006. Verizon still uses the 
Bell logo on payphones and on the back of Verizon 
trucks, but not as a key symbol. Malheur Bell, a 
wholly-owned, but separately-operated subsidiary of 
Qwest Corporation, continues to use the logo, and 
is now the last former AT&T entity to continue to 
use the Bell logo. (Bellsouth Corporation corporate 
history, 2010, p.1)
AT&T, originally the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company, has Alexander Graham Bell to thank for 
its true origins. With his invention of the telephone 
in 1876, came the foundation of the company that 
would become AT&T. This brand has since become 
one of the most well-known and reliable telephone 
services globally. 
In 1984, through an agreement between the former 
AT&T and the U.S. Department of Justice, AT&T agre-
ed to divest itself of its local telephone operations 
but retain its long distance, R&D and manufacturing 
arms. From this arrangement, SBC Communications 
Inc. (formerly known as Southwestern Bell Corp.) 
was born.
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Twelve years later, the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 caused an upheaval of the status quo in the 
market. SBC Communications Inc. established itself 
as a global communications provider by acquiring 
Pacific Telesis Group (1997), Southern New England 
Telecommunications (1998) and Ameritech Corp. 
(1999). In 2005, SBC Communications Inc. acquired 
AT&T Corp., creating the new AT&T.
With the merger of AT&T and BellSouth in December 
29, 2006, and the consolidated ownership of 
Cingular Wireless and YELLOWPAGES.COM, AT&T was 
in a position to lead the industry in one of its most 
significant transformations since the invention of 
the telephone more than 130 years ago (AT&T cor-
porate history, 2010, p.1).
Telefonía Celular de Nicaragua, S.A. (“Telefonía”), a 
Nicaraguan corporation headquartered in Managua, 
Nicaragua, is an indirectly majority-owned subsi-
diary of BellSouth. When it was founded in 1997, 
Telefonía was Nicaragua’s only provider of wireless 
telephone services. From March 1997 through 
June 2000, BellSouth held a 49 percent ownership 
interest in Telefonía and an option for an addi-
tional 40 percent. During that same period, BSI 
controlled Telefonía’s operations by contractual 
agreement between BSI and Telefonía, and con-
trolled Telefonía’s management through a majority 
presence on Telefonía’s board of directors (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2002, p.3). BellSouth 
increased its ownership interest in Telefonía to 89 
percent in June 2000. Telefonía is commonly known 
as BellSouth Nicaragua.
The incident: A framework of facts
The following information is based on El Nuevo 
Diario (Nicaragua), 01/25/00, 01/26/00, 01/28/00; 
La Prensa (2000), 01/25/00, 01/29/00, 01/31/00: 
BellSouth de Nicaragua, a subsidiary of US-based 
BellSouth, was at the heart of a scandal involving 
influence-peddling in the National Assembly. As 
previously stated, in 1997 BellSouth acquired a 
49 percent ownership interest in Telefonía, and an 
option granted by members of a Nicaraguan family, 
the co-owners, to acquire an additional 40 percent. 
When BellSouth acquired its minority interest in 
Telefonía, a Nicaraguan law, Article 29 of the General 
Law of Telecommunications and Postal Services, 
prohibited foreign companies such as BellSouth 
from acquiring a majority interest in Nicaraguan 
telecommunications companies. For BellSouth to 
exercise its 40 percent option, as it intended, the 
Nicaraguan legislature would have to repeal the 
Article 29 foreign ownership restriction. 
Related to BellSouth’s acquisition of Telefonía, 
BellSouth and the Nicaraguan co-owners formed an 
agreement allowing BellSouth operational control of 
Telefonía, under which BellSouth became responsible 
for Telefonía’s daily operations and for its long-term 
business planning. Moreover, after BellSouth’s in-
vestment in Telefonía, Telefonía’s board of directors 
was restructured, and four of the six Telefonía board 
seats were filled by BellSouth personnel. 
In October 1998, Telefonía hired Ethel Argüello de 
Calderón, the wife of Silvio Americo Calderón, the 
chairman of the Nicaraguan legislative committee 
which supervised Nicaraguan telecommunications. 
Mr. Americo Calderón later ran for a seat on the 
Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE). Following their 
agreement, Mrs. Argüello de Calderón was to be 
responsible for providing various regulatory and 
legislative services, including lobbying for repeal 
of the foreign ownership restriction. Although 
she had prior financial and operations experience 
in the telecommunications area, she had no prior 
legislative experience. It was known at the time 
that she had recently been fired from her job with 
local fixed-line provider Empresa Nicaragüense de 
Telecomunicaciones (ENITEL) because of allegations 
of corrupt practices. Telefonía hired Mrs. Argüello 
de Calderón to provide services to Telefonía over a 
three-month trial period for a monthly fee of US$ 
6,500, making her the second most-highly paid 
individual on Telefonía’s payroll. 
The lobbyist worked predominantly on the repeal 
of the foreign ownership restriction. Because her 
husband chaired the legislative committee with 
jurisdiction over the foreign ownership restriction, 
BellSouth knew that by having hired Argüello de 
Calderón it had violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”). Although a former local 
in-house Telefonía attorney approved Mrs. Argüello 
de Calderón’s continued employment, BellSouth 
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officials knew, or should have known, that the 
lawyer lacked sufficient experience or training to 
enable him to properly and effectively judge the 
situation in hand. 
During Argüello de Calderón’s employment at 
Bellsouth, her husband, the legislator, drafted the 
text of the proposed repeal of the foreign ownership 
restriction and enlisted support for the proposed 
repeal from other Committee members. He scheduled 
and presided at a hearing in April 1999, during which 
his Committee heard arguments from BellSouth and 
others advocating repeal of the foreign ownership 
restriction. 
In May 1999, Telefonía ended the employment 
of Mrs. Argüello de Calderón, and in June 1999, 
Telefonía recorded the total sum of US$ 60,000 
paid to her as consulting services and as a sever-
ance payment. In September 1999, the Committee 
put forward the proposed amendment for approval 
to the Nicaraguan National Assembly. In December 
1999, the National Assembly approved the amend-
ment and voted to repeal the foreign ownership 
restriction. BellSouth exercised its 40 percent option 
and increased its ownership interest in Telefonía to 
89 percent in June 2000 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2002, p.3). 
In an interview with the newspaper El Nuevo Diario 
in January 2000, Mr. Carlos Fernández Roque, 
Telefonía’s General Manager at the time of the scan-
dal, argued that he had warned BellSouth officers in 
the U.S. that the company was violating U.S. law. 
Fernández told lawyers of BellSouth in February 
1999 about the arrangement with Calderón’s wife. 
In May of that same year, company lawyers went to 
Managua and ordered Telefonía’s directors to fire her 
(based on El Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua), 01/25/00, 
01/26/00, 01/28/00; La Prensa (2000), 01/25/00, 
01/29/00, 01/31/00) (Nicaragua).
Shortly thereafter, Fernández argued that the 
Nicaragua directors forced him to resign, offering 
him US$ 165,000 to sign a document affirming that 
the company had violated no laws. Fernández refu-
sed to sign and decided later to sue the company and 
to inform the mass media his version of the events.
Through Telefonía’s public relations director Julie 
Hershkowitz, the company denied hiring Calderón’s 
wife to influence legislation. Hershkowitz argued 
that the company had not used any corrupt tactics 
and that the telecommunications law had been 
changed after Calderón’s wife left the company. 
Furthermore, she stated that the amendment would 
in fact benefit the Nicaraguan people, who would 
receive better service.
In the National Assembly, congressman Noel Vidaurre 
of the Partido Conservador de Nicaragua (PCN) 
claimed that BellSouth had “bought” Calderón, 
through his wife, and advised him to resign from 
the Assembly and withdraw his candidacy for the 
Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) seat. He also 
criticized colleague Wálmaro Gutiérrez of the PLC 
Party, who had argued that Calderón had not been 
involved in influence-peddling as this was not an 
offense recognized by Nicaraguan law. 
Calderón denied he was influenced by BellSouth 
with regards to pressuring the change in legisla-
tion, and pointed out that various other firms such 
as Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP) 
and ENITEL also supported the change in the tele-
communications law. According to him, allowing 
foreign ownership of Nicaraguan businesses would 
encourage more foreign investment and would help 
the privatization process of ENITEL and other state 
companies. He accused Fernández, Telefonía’s for-
mer General Manager, of attacking him and his wife 
to discredit BellSouth and to boost his chances of 
winning his lawsuit. 
But an editorial in the newspaper La Prensa argued 
that, the existence or lack thereof of the crime of 
influence-peddling in Nicaraguan law notwithstan-
ding, Calderón should publicly apologize for his 
actions. If Calderón did not foresee the implications 
of a conflict of interest in his wife’s employment 
with BellSouth, said the editorial, “we are then fa-
cing a case of total incompetence and lack of good 
judgement, and he should resign his post”. 
Telefonía violated Section 13(b)(6) of the Exchange 
Act, which requires companies which hold 50 per-
cent or less of the voting power to proceed in good 
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faith and to use their influence, as far as reasonably 
possible under the circumstances, to ensure that the 
entity complies with the FCPA’s “books and records” 
and “internal controls” provisions. BellSouth, during 
the relevant period, held less than 50 percent of 
the voting power of Telefonía, yet through its ope-
rational control, had sufficient influence to ensure 
that Telefonía complied with the FCPA’s books and 
records and internal controls provisions. Although 
BellSouth was, or should have been, able to ensure 
the compliance of Telefonía, the latter created false 
books and records by improperly recording payments 
to Mrs. Calderón as “consulting services”. BellSouth 
failed to devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls at Telefonía, sufficient to de-
tect and prevent FCPA violations (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2002, p.4). 
There were several warning signals which should 
have alerted BellSouth to the illegal nature of 
their actions. For example, in Venezuela, in 1991, 
BellSouth acquired a minority interest in Telcel, 
Venezuela’s leading wireless internet provider. In 
August 1997, BellSouth increased its ownership 
percentage, thus acquiring a majority interest. 
Telcel contributed more revenue to BellSouth’s 
Latin American Group segment than any other Latin 
American BellSouth operation. 
Between September 1997 and August 2000, former 
Telcel senior management authorized payments to-
taling approximately US$ 10.8 million to six offshore 
companies. Telcel recorded the disbursements in 
Telcel’s books and records based on fictitious in-
voices. The invoices indicated, without detail, that 
Telcel had received professional, computer and con-
tracting services from the companies. However, there 
were no service or vendor agreements supporting 
the alleged services, and, in fact, no services were 
rendered. BellSouth has been unable to properly 
identify the circumstances or purpose of the pay-
ments, or the identity of their ultimate recipients.
In other words, Telcel created false books and 
records by improperly recording the falsely docu-
mented, unsubstantiated payments to the offshore 
companies as authentic services. In addition, Telcel’s 
internal controls failed to detect the unsubstantia-
ted payments for a period of at least two years. This 
control deficiency has further impeded BellSouth 
from determining the circumstances of the pay-
ments, or the identity of their recipients. Telcel 
violated Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the 
Exchange Act, commonly referred to as the “books 
and records” and “internal controls” provisions, res-
pectively, of the FCPA. These acts generally require 
that a company with a class of securities registered 
pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act make 
and keep books, records and accounts, which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect their 
transaction and disposition of assets. They must also 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances 
that: transactions are executed in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization; 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit 
preparation of financial statements conforming to 
generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements and to 
maintain accountability for assets; access to assets 
is permitted only in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization; and the recorded 
accountability for assets is compared with the exis-
ting assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate 
action is taken with respect to any differences 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002, p.4).
General:
These practices occurred not only in Nicaragua, but 
in different countries, all violating FCPA law.
The consequences
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 
BellSouth a penalty for US$ 150,000. The SEC also 
ordered BellSouth remedial actions (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2002, p.4). 
Corporate Governance at Telefonía will be analyzed 
utilizing the reversed KISS principle (Hilb, 2008, 
p. 12-13):
a) Keep It Situational:
 • Multinationals have to pay a lot of attention to 
their subsidiaries’ boards (subsidiary governance). 
In Telefonía’s case, its board was not a “puppet 
62
Clío América. Enero - Junio 2015, Vol. 9 No. 17, p.p. 57 - 66
Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad delMagdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena
International Corporate Governance at Bellsouth: A corporate scandal in Nicaragua
board”; on the contrary, it had too much power 
and no accountability or oversight. In fact, 
BellSouth in Atlanta (the parent company) had 
no idea of Telefonía’s actions in Nicaragua. This 
proofs that extremes do not provide a favorable 
situation. Although board members were local, 
they were not competent and committed; their 
integrity was in question. 
 • An effective board has to be able to challenge 
whatever it considers not right. Most U.S. cor-
porations have the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance, where shareholder value 
is maximized. It is obvious that in the Telefonía 
case, the Board was concerned with shareholders, 
and unable to challenge them. The Board paid no 
attention to its customers, employees and society 
in general (Hilb, 2008, p. 12). It seems that for 
Telefonía, society was at the last place of priority.
b) Keep It Strategic:
 • The company’s success, and those of its top 
executives, was based on quarterly results. In 
Telefonía’s case, there was no set of alternative 
measures for the company’s success. Customer, 
owner, employee, and society indicators were not 
included in the measures of success.
 • An effective board of directors should possess, in 
a strategic and not necessarily in an operational 
way, the same functional know-how and market 
knowledge as top management (Hilb, 2009, p.13). 
As you can see in Figure 1, other types of roles 
have to be included in the board (i.e., controller, 
developer, creative thinker, HR manager, financial 
analyst, alliance manager, promoter, entrepreneur, 
auditor and risk manager). In Telefonía’s case, 
there were no complementary roles. Everyone 
played either a promoter or a controller role; the 
other roles mentioned were completely absent. 
 • All of Telefonía’s board members were men, bet-
ween 40 and 55 years old, and Nicaraguan. In 
other words, there were no female, international, 
young and independent board members. Everyone 
pretty much looked the same, and had similar life 
and professional experiences. As you can see in 
Figure 2, there should be board diversity.
Figura 1.
Figura 2.
Areas of Board Know-how:
Social Roles of Board Teams and Board 
Diversity:



















Source: Hilb, M. (2008). New Corporate Governance. Springer. 
New York.
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c) Keep It Integrated:
 • One of the major weaknesses of many boards 
is poor succession planning. As a preventive 
measure, there should be in place a succession 
planning system, where successors are nominated 
in advance and with sufficient time. In the case 
of Telefonía, there is no evidence of a formal 
succession planning both for director and for key 
top managers. 
 • With everything that is happening in the world 
today, it is mandatory that a company has proper 
personnel compensation policies. These policies 
have to take into consideration both the short 
term and long-term horizon of the company (i.e. 
60% of bonus based on a one-year basis and 40% 
of bonus based on a four-year basis) (Hilb, 2009, 
p. 13). The key performance indicators should not 
only be financial, such as revenue, net income, 
and EVA or Economic Profit, but customer, opera-
tional and learning related indicators (i.e. Kaplan 
and Norton’s four perspectives on the Balanced 
Scorecard). In the case of Telefonía, there is no 
evidence of such a personnel compensation po-
licy. All compensation was short term and purely 
financial oriented.
d) Keep It Controlled:
 • Legal and ethical compliance are two of the most 
important board tasks. Good corporate governan-
ce should emphasize both legitimacy and legal 
domains (Figure 3). One of the greatest areas of 
improvement is ethical compliance. And there 
is a difference between ethical compliance and 
legal compliance. Sometimes an action or issue 
can be legal (permitted by the law), but not 
legitimate. Also, policies of good behavior are 
worthless if they are just written in paper, and 
not followed and enforced by the company’s lea-
dership. In Telefonía’s case, there was a violation 
of both legal and ethical issues. First, regardless 
of whether the crime of influence-peddling exits 
in Nicaraguan law, it was unethical for Telefonía 
to hire the wife of a congressman who was in 
charge of passing a law that would have bene-
fitted Telefonía. As mentioned before, corporate 
governance has to be on both the legality and 
legitimacy domains. If Telefonía did not foresee 
the implications of a conflict of interest in the 
employment of the congressman’s wife, there was 
a showing of complete incompetence and lack 
of judgement in the Board. Second, Telefonía, 
a subsidiary of a U.S. company, BellSouth, had 
















 •  Two of the main responsibilities of a Board are the 
control and direction of the organization. Boards 
cannot delegate these functions. Companies need 
to be proactive, and therefore should not wait 
for new regulations; they should take preventive 
measures. In Telefonía’s case, there is no evidence 
that these evaluations were conducted.
Managing Risks
Risk management is the identification, assessment, 
and prioritization of risks. This has to be followed by 
the coordinated application of resources to minimi-
ze, monitor, and control the probability and impact 
of unfortunate future events (Hubbard, 2009, p.46). 
Risks can come from improbability in financial mar-
kets, plan failures, cultural topics, market related, 
legal responsibilities, credit risk, calamities, natural 
causes, unexpected events and disasters as well as 
deliberate attacks from any rival. (Figure 4).
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In the case of Telefonía, there was a failure to mana-
ge risks, especially legal risks. There was a violation 
of U.S. FCPA laws. There violations were going on 
while the Board and Management of BellSouth head-
quarters in Atlanta had initially no knowledge about.
We propose the following four steps (Figure 5) at 
Telefonía in order to identify some problems in the 
company regarding in the risk management process 
(Rejda, 2008, p.43-45):
 • Identify Loss Exposures: the first step in the 
risk management process is to identify all major 
and minor loss exposures. This step involves 
a painstaking analysis of all potential losses. 
For instance: property loss exposures, business 
income loss exposures, employee benefit loss ex-
posures, foreign loss exposures, market reputation 
and public image of the company and failure to 
comply with government laws and regulations.
Figura 4.
Risks Traps
Risk traps as the basis of risk management 
strategies at the board level
Source: Hilb, M. (2008). New Corporate Governance. Springer. New York.
 • Analyze the Loss Exposures: the second step is 
to analyze the loss exposures. This step involves 
an estimation of the frequency and severity of 
loss.
 • Select Appropriate Techniques for Treating the 
Loss Exposures: the third step is to select the 
most appropriate technique, or combination of 
techniques, for treating the loss exposures. For 
example: risk control at the company that refers 
to techniques that reduce the frequency and 
severity of losses.
 • Implement and Monitor the Risk Management 
Program: is to implement and monitor the risk 
management program. This step begins with 
a policy statement. In addition to this, a risk 
management manual may be developed and used 
in the program. To be effective, the risk manage-
ment program must be periodically reviewed and 
evaluated to determine whether the objectives 
are being attained.
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Boards that deliver competitive 
advantage
In the case of Telefonía, the Board definitively failed 
to prevent a misdeed. But a board should not only 
prevent a misdeed or guarantee compliance, but 
should find a way to add value. Instead of just being 
measured by its inputs –the processes and structures 
used by the board–, boards should be measured by 
outputs –the value that it adds to a corporation‒. 
Boards need to evolve from a ceremonial (rubber-
stamp) to a progressive (not liberated) board 
(Charan, 2005, p.57). In progressive boards, di-
rectors operate as a group. There is mutual respect 
and trust among directors. Everyone participates 
and consensus is very frequently achieved on key 
issues. The Board focuses on issues that are value-
added and anticipatory, as well as those that are 
compliance-related. 
In the case of Telefonía, the board was not cere-
monial. Nor was it progressive. Instead it was a 
liberated board. Directors pretty much did what 
they wanted, without the involvement and consent 
of the CEO. This is how they got in trouble with 
compliance and legal issues, especially with the FCPA 
violations. Telefonía’s fate would have been different 
if its Board would have had a progressive approach.
Conclusions
BellSouth and Telefonía have to take remedial ac-
tions, such as the disciplining and even terminating 
of any employee that had an active participation in 
the scandal, and the formation of steps to enhance 
its FCPA compliance program, which should consist 
of a number of components, including corporate 
governance, policies and procedures, training, in-
ternal auditing, and corrective action and discipline. 
For example, every employee and supplier should be 
trained in the FCPA. A progressive Board of Directors 
should be named, replacing the old one.
The violations of law that underlie the case described 
in this article stem from actions and omissions relat-
ing to BellSouth’s subsidiary in Nicaragua, Telefonía 
Celular de Nicaragua, S.A. One of the major weak-
nesses of several boards is poor succession planning. 
As a preventive measure, there should be in place 
a succession planning system, where successors 
are nominated in advance and with sufficient time. 
In the case of Telefonía, there is no evidence of a 
formal succession planning both for director and for 
key top managers.
There was no set of alternative measures for the 
company’s success at Telefonía. Customer, owner, 
employee, and society indicators were not included 
in the measures of success. Moreover, there was a 
failure to manage risks, especially legal risks and 
violation of U.S. FCPA laws. There violations were 
going on while the Board and Management of 
BellSouth headquarters in Atlanta had initially no 
knowledge about.
Figura 5.
Steps in the Risk Management Process
Identify loss exposures 
Analyze the loss exposures 
Select the appropiate 
techniques for treating the 
loss exposures 
Implement and monitor  the 
risk management program 
Source: Rejda, G. (2008). Principles of Risk Management and 
Insurance (Third Edition). Pearson. Boston.p.43
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To sum up, this case is an important scene in a real 
world in order to avoid at all many events against the 
company’s culture that affect image and reputation 
and of course, company death.
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